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RISKS OF AN ASSIGNEE UNDER RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
The prevailing custom of extending credit upon the security of choses in action and claims for monies due and to become
due results in a definite business need for some basis of safety
for the assignee; some methed by which he may become reasonably safe in taking such assignments as security for the credit
extended. For example, in a Yecent casel decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, a finance company took an assignment from a contractor of monies to become due by virtue of
performance of a certain contract in order to secure it for advancements for the cost of equipment,'and the finance company
lost the benefit of its securty because the contractor had previously assigned the claim to a bonding company. A large
amount of money was involved. Once the same claim has been
assigned to two or more assignees who have in good faith given
a valuable consideration for it, a decision between them will necessarily work a hardship on someone. Much litigation as well
as academic interest has in the past centered .around the problem of working out a proper basis for decisions in such cases.
Modern business methods have rendered the problem more practical in its aspect.
Similar problems arise when bona fide purchasers take assignments of choses in action which are subject to latent equities of such third parties as defrauded prior assignees in the
same chain of title, or of defrauded cestui sque trustent.
Sections 173 and 174 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts deal with these problems. One of the sections purports
to make an important change in the law, one of the few instances in which the reporter and his advisers assumed to depart
from the majority rule upon a point as found in the cases;
the other section amounts to the exercise of a choice between two
competing rules of law which were about evenly divided. This
choice was made upon the basis of a Supreme Court decision
rendered in 1924.2 The rules of Sections 173 and 174 are both
in a sense new law upon an important business problem. It is
Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182.
Ibid.
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the purpose of this discussion to point out the significance of
Sections 173 and 174, to test them upon the basis of their application to business needs, and to attempt to analyze and estimate
the decision of the United States Supreme Court which was responsible for the adoption of the rule of Section 173.3
The party who purchases a chose in action or who extends
credit upon the faith of an assignment of monies due or to become due to his assignor has always been subject to several
types of risk, which may for convenience be placed in three
classes:
1. The risk that his assignor's debtor may have a valid
defense against the claim assigned and that the claim may there1
fore be valueless.
2. The risk that the assignor may have previously assigned
the claim to someone else.
3. That some person may assert an equitable claim of ownership to the chose, i. e., the claim may be subject to the latent
equity, for example, of a defrauded cestui que trust or a defrauded prior assignor.
The first of these three risks has been the least dangerous
not only because possible defenses of the obligor would be less
surprising but because of the possibility of making inquiry of
the debtor and of ascertaining whether or not he has a defense.
The problem of the defenses available to the debtor will not be
taken up, but the discussion will be concerned with the second
and third types of risk mentioned. These two problems are covered by Sections 173 and 174 of the Restatement. Section 173,
which presents the central problem, will be taken up last. Section 174 reads as follows:4
"If an assignor's right against the obligor is voidable by some one
other than the obligor or is held in trust for such a person, an assignee
who purchases the assignment for value in good faith neither knowing
nor having reason to know of the right of such person cannot be deprived of the assigned right or its proceeds."

According to Section 174, if an original obligee is fraudulently induced to make an assignment and the fraudulent assignee makes a subsequent assignment to an innocent purchaser
for value, the secondary assignee gets good title to the claim and
3

Ibid.

4Restatement of the Law of Contracts, American Law Institute,
lbontracts, 0. D. No. 1, 9-15-28, page 219.
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the original obligee's latent equity is cut off. It has long been
true that the rights of a defrauded vendor of a chattel were cut
off by a sale by the fraudulent vendee to an innocent purchaser,5 but until the time of the publication of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, it had been the majority rule in
the United States that the assignee of a chose in action who acquired his claim from a fraudulent assignee of a defrauded
prior owner, took subject to the equitable rights of the defrauded prior owner.6 If C. had a claim against D, and F by
fraud obtained an assignment of the claim from C and reassigned to G, C was preferred over G. The theory was that C
and G both had equitable interests and the equity prior in time
prevailed. A generation or two of American law students have
in the past been perplexed with wondering, "Why is it that I
can get a good title to a horse from a fraudulent vendee and cut
off the equities of a defrauded vendor, and can't get a good
title to a chose in action against a defrauded assignor from a
fraudulent assignee?" When he has asked his teacher or consulted the text books he has received rather a dusty answer.
He has been told that it is because the fraudulent vendee of the
horse had legal title and therefore could pass legal title, and
that the fraudulent assignee had only an equitable title and
could pass only an equitable title to him, and that the legal title
in case of the purchase of the horse cut off the defrauded party's
equity and that his equitable title to the chose would not cut off
the prior equity of the defrauded assignor. The bewildered
student, reacting to the explanation as academic and rather unrelated to tlie kind of practical business problems that he had
innocently supposed rules of law were intended to serve, has
been wont to flee to the big books as a seared young rabbit to
a briar patch, in quest of the important distinction between equitable and legal title. He has emerged, confused and disgusted,
after a long wandering through the wilderness of argument as
to whether an assignment of a chose in action passes legal or
equitable title.7 Finally he has put the whole matter aside as
one of those things to be renfembered rather than understood.
'Williston on Contracts, Vol. I, section 404.
SIbid.

'Williston, Vol. I, see. 447; also 30 Harvard L. Rev. 91; rdem. 822;

articles by Professor Cook, 29 Harvard L. Rev. 816; and 80 Id. 449.
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Section 174 has done much to alleviate the student's burden
and to simplify the law and, if it is followed by the courts,
the time may not be far off when one may say to the earnest
young student of the law: "The innocent purchaser of a chattel
or a chose in action from a fraudulent vendee or fraudulent assignee gets title free from the latent equities of the defrauded
vendor of the chattel or defrauded assignor of the chose."
Surely those who believe that safety in the purchase of
choses in action, or safety in taking them as security is an end
to be desired in the present day business world, and those who
believe that there is intrinsic merit in simplicity, will react to
Section 174 as progress. It is interesting to observe, however,
that the committee in a note expressly admit that the weight of
authority on the point is contrary to their statement in Section
174.8 While the purpose of the Restatement, as the name implies, is to restate and not to reform the law, the draftsmen
frankly reserve to themselves the privilege of choosing in certain
instances a minority rule where they regard it as clearly the
better suited to business needs. It is believed that the committee
was quite justified in so doing in this instance and that the reliability of the work as a restatement will not be diminished
thereby; especially since attention is called to the departure
from the majority rule by the draftsmen themselves.
If it is agreed that the reporter and his advisers have done
a valuable service to business in rendering the taking of assignments of choses in action more safe and have rendered a service
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, page 279.
Cases collected by the Reporter of the Restatement which support
the rule of See. 174 are as follows: Winter v. Montgomery Gas Light
Co., 89 Ala. 544, 7 So. 773; First Nat. Bank v. Perris IrrigationDist.,
107 Cal. 55, 40 Pac. 45; Duke v. Clark, 58 Miss. 465; Williams v. Donnelly, 54 Nebraska 193, 74 N. W. 601; Dewitt v. Vansickle, 29 N. J.Eq.
209; Mifflin County Bank's Apeal, 98 Pa. 150; Huber's Assigned Estate,
21 Pa. Sup. Ct., 612, 615.
Cases contra collected by the Reporter are "mfollows: Pearson v.
Leucht, 199 Ill. 475; Brown v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc., 75 Minn. 412, 79
X. W. 968; Tripp v. Jordan, 177 Mo. App. 339, 164 S. W. 158; Central
Trust Co. v. West India Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E. 387; Morganthaler
v. Cohen, 103 Ohio St. 328, 132 N. E. 730; Keyes v. Pouder, (Okla. 1924)
226 Pac. 73; Perkins v. W. A. Lippincott Co., 260 Pa. 473, 103 Atl. 877;
Downer V. South Royalton Bank, 39 Vt. 25; Cockell v. Taylor, 15 Beav.
103.
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to the lawyer and law student by simplifying the law, let us
examine the companion section, No. 1739, which reads as follows:
"Where the obligee or an assignee makes two or more successive
assignments of the same right, each of which would have been effective
if it were the only assignment, the respective rights of the several assignees are determined by the following rules:
(a) A subsequent assignee acquires a right against the obligor
to the exclusion of a prior assignee if the prior assignment is revocable
or voidable by the assignor;
(b) Any assignee who purchases his assignment for value in good
faith neither knowing nor having reason to know of a prior assignment, and who obtains:
(i) payment or satisfaction of the obligation, or
(ii) judgment against the obligor, or
(liit) a new obligation of the obligor by a novation, or
(lv) delivery of a tangible token or writing, surrender0 of which
Is required by the obligor's contract for its enforcement,
can retain any performance so received and can enforce any judgment
or novation so acquired, and, if he has obtained a token or writing as
stated in paragraph (iv), can enforce against the obligor the assigned
right;
(c) Except as stated in Clauses (a) and (b), a prior assignee is
entitled to the exclusion of a subsequent assignee to the assigned right
and its proceeds.

Stated briefly, and with sufficient accuracy for the purposes of this discussion, Section 173 simply tells us that of two
successive assignees, the one whose assignment was first in order
of time prevails unless the casd falls within one of the exceptions
listed in subsections (a) or (b), regardless of whether or not
any notice of the earlier assignment was given to the debtor. In
order to avoid the possibility of the general rule being confused
and obscured by the exceptions and the side show swallowing up
the circus, it will probably be well to postpone any examination
of Subsections (a) and (b) and the exceptions therein contained,
and focus attention upon the rule of Subsection (c), to the effect
that as between two successive assignees of the same chose in
action, the first in order of time prevails, regardless of any
question of notice to the obligor.
In enunciating this doctrine, the Restatement exercised a
choice between two well known rules often referred to as the
American and English rules. The American doctrine was
chosen and the so-called English rule rejected. The rejected rule,
page 217.
'Restatement,
1
ONote in connection with the four exceptions set forth in subsection (b) of Sec. 173, that in each instance the second assignee would
have obtained a legal right which would prevail over the prior equitable right. Subsection (a) is self-explanatory.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

which is usually referred to as the rule of Dearle v. Hall,"
was as much American as the so-called American rule in that
as many American cases had adopted it as were committed to
12
the so-called American rule.
An examination of Mr. Williston's own collection of cases
contained in his footnotes numbers 6 and 8 of See. 435 of Williston on Contracts shows about twice as many jurisdictions following the rule of Dearle v. Hall as follow the rule approved by
Section 173 of the Restatement.1 3 Fairness, however, requires
Williston on Cbntracts, Vol. I, Sec. 435.
"In Sec. 435 of Williston on Contracts is a comprehensive list of
cases bearing upon the rights of successive assignees, to which the note
on Sec. 173 in the Restatement refers. Cases contra to Dearle v. Hall
and In accord with Sec. 173 are:
Sutherland v. Reeves, 151 Ill. 384, 38 N. E. 130; White v. Wiley, 14
Ind. 496; Summers v. Hutson, 48 Ind. 228; Newby v. Hill, 2 Metcalf
(Ky.) 530; Lexington Brewing Co. v. Hamon, 155 Ky. 711, 160 S. W.
264; Columbia, etc., Trust Co. v. FirstNat. Bank, 116 Ky. 364, 76 S. W.
156; Thayer v. Daniels, 113 Mass. 129; Whittredge v. Sweetser, 189
Mass. 45, 75 N. E. 222; Burton v. Cage, 85 Minn. 355, 88 N. W. 997;
Muir v. Schenck, 3 Hill 228, 38 Am. Dec. 633; Bush v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y.
535; Greentreev. Rosenstock, 61 N. Y. 583; Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.
Y. 598; Fairbanksv. Sargent, 104 N. Y. 108, 118; 9 N. E. 870; Fortunato
v. Patten, 147 N. Y. 277, 41 N. E. 572; Central Tr. Co. v. W. Ind. Imp.
Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 323; Lindsay v. Wilson, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 85; Meier
v. Hess, 23 Oregon 599, 32 Pac. 755; Youngberg v. El Paso Brick Co.,
Tex. Civ. App., 155 S. W. 715; Davis v. State Nat. Bank, Tex. Civ. App.,
156 S. W. 321; West Texas Lumber Co. v. Greene County, 188 S. W. 283;
Daly's Exec. v. Warren, 80 Va. 512; Clark v. Hogeman, 13 W. Va., 718;
Tingle v. Fisher,20 W. Va. 497.
This list, it will be observed, contains decisions of nine Jurisdictions with decisions contra to Dearie v. Hall which had not been overruled at the time compiled, 1921.
Cases following the rule of Dearle v. Hall are as follows:
In re Hawley Furnace Co., 23 Fed. 451, Pa.; Graham Paper Co. v.
Pembroke, 124 Cal. 117, 56 Pac. 627; Jackson v. Hamm, 14 Col. 58, 23
Pac. 88; Bishop v. Holcomb, 10 Conn. 444, 446; National Bank v. U. S.
Security Co., 17 D. C. App. 112; Merchants, etc., Bank v. Hewitt, 3 Iowa
93, 66 Am. Dec. 49; Manning v. Matthews, 70 Iowa 303, 30 N. W. 749;
Lambert v. Morgan, 110 Md. 17, 72 Atl. 407; Enochs-Davis, etc., Co. v.
Ndwcomb, 79 Miss. 462, 30 So. 608; Murdoch v. Finney, 21 Mo. 138;
Houser v. Richardson, 90 Mo. App. 134; Jenkinson,v. N. Y. Finance Co.,
79 N. J. Eq. 247, 82 Atl. 36; Copeland v. Zianton, 22 Ohio St. 398, 401;
Citizens National Bank v. Mitchell, 24 Okla. 488, 103 Pac. 720; Market
National Bank v. Raspberry, 34 Okla. 243, 124 Pac. 758; Fraley's Appeal, 205 Pa. 515; Peters v. Goetz, 136 Tenn. 247, 188 S. W. 1144; Ward
v. Morrison, 25 Vt. 593; Coffman v. Leggett, 107 Va. 418, 59 S. W. 392.
"This list contains decisions of sixteen Jurisdictions, almost twice
the number contained in the list given by Mr. Williston contra to
Dearle v. Hall. The Federal Courts, prior to the Salem Trust Co. case
were in accord with the actual decision of Dearle v. Hall; See Williston, Vol. I, Sec. 435, footnote No. 8.
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ne to admit that American authority contra to Dearle v. Hall
was as strong as authority in favor of it; New York, the most
important commercial state, having repeatedly rejected it 14 and
Illinois' 5 and Alassachusetts16 also being -opposed.
In order to make an intelligent comparison of the American rule stated in Sectio 174 and the so-called English rule,
the latter, should perhaps be set out and its scope and history
briefly discussed. The English rule is to the effect that in cases
of two or more successive assignments, the assignee who first
gives notice to the debtor will prevail. In the case of Dearle v.
Hal1, " 7 decided in England in 1828, one Brown assigned his
rights to an annuity to one Dearle as collateral security. The
trustee was given no notice of the" assignment. Later Brown
assigned the same claim to Hall, who made inquiry of the trustee in order to ascertain whether he had received notice of any
assignment. The Court held that Hall, who knew. nothing of
the prior assignment, and who had made inquiry of the trustee,
should prevail over the prior assignee, Dearle, who had omitted
to give notice of his assignment. The basis of the decision of.
Dearle v. Hall had been in dispute, but in the case of Ward v.
Duncombe,18 decided by the House of Lords in 1893, the Court
said that the reason for the decision of Dearte v. Hall was the
possibility of fraud upon the second assignee resulting from
failure of the prior assignee to give notice to the trustee.
It will be noted that in the case of Dearle v. Hall the second
assignee in order of time who was preferred over the prior assignee had actually made inquiry of the trustee in a diligent
effort to ascertain whether or not there had been a prior assignment and that the case of Dearle v. Hall is therefore no authority for saying that an assignee second in order of time who had
made no inquiry of the obligor would be preferred over the first
assignee in order of time simply because the second assignee
u Muir v. lchneck, 3 Hill 228, 38 Am. Dec. 633; Bush v. Lathrop, 33
N. Y. 535; Greentreev. Rosenstock, 61 N. Y. 583; Williams v. Ingersoll,
89 N. Y. 108; Fairbanks v. SJargent, 104 N. Y. 108, 9 N. E. 870; Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N. Y. 277, 41 N. E. 572; central Trust Co. v. w.
India Imp. (o., 169 N. Y. 314, 323.
"Sutherland v. Reeve, 151 Ill. 384, 38 N. E. 130.
nWhittredge v. Sweetser, 189 Mass. 45, 75 N. D. 222.
n 3 Russell 1. The facts of Deare v. Hall are analyzed and discussed in U. of Pa. L. Rev., Vol. 60, p. 668.
"(1893) App. Cases 369.
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gave notice and the first assignee had omitted to do so. But in
the case of Foster v. Cockerell,'19 in 1835, the rule of Dearne v.
Hall was extended. That case held that it makes no difference
whether the second assignee makes inquiry of the obligor or not;
the first assignee giving notice to the obligor prevails. The English rule then is the result of three cases; it is the decision of
Dearle v. Hall as interpreted by Ward v. Duncombe and as extended by iFosterv. Cockerell.2 0 The doctrine of Dearle v. Hall,
then, is wider than the actual decision of the case itself and
"the English rule" and "the rule of Dearle v. Hall" are generally used as synonymous expressions.
The rule of Dearle v. Hall has been preferred to the American rule by a majority of text writers, 21 including notably Pomeroy 22 and Williston,23 the reporter of the Restatement. The
reason for their preference for the English rule was that the
requisite of notice to the debtor, when required, operated somewhat like a recording system. The notice to the debtor provides
a source of information to which an intending assignee can go
to ascertain whether his intended assignor still owns the claim.
Mr. Williston, in his treatise on contracts, in Volume 1, Section
435, has the following to say upon the point:
"In England by a rule which though not depending upon statute
may be compared to a recording act, whichever of two several assignees
first gives notice Is preferred over the other assignees though they have
prior assignments . . . it seems best to adopt the test of notice in
contests between successive assignees, even though prior assignees are
likely to suffer thereby until business men learn what is necessary."

In view of the apparent practical advantage of requiring
the first assignee to give notice in order to cut off a. subsequent
bona fide purchase of the claim, the attitude of writers generally and the preference of the reporter himself, it is very surprising to find the Restatement enunciating in Section 173 the
rule which gives preference to the assignee first in time, regardless of whether he has given notice or not; especially since the
13 Cl. & F. 456.
1 60 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 668, supra.
1dem. Also see: Keasby, Notice of Assignments in Equity, 1910, 19
Yale L. J. 258, and (1912) 25 Harv. L. Rev. 728, and Williston on Contracts, Sec. 435, and Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (1907) Sec. 695,
Note 1.
1Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (1907) Sec. 695, Note 1.
= Williston on Contracts, Sec. 435.
2
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choice of the rejected rule would not have required the committee to change existing majority law, as they frankly did in case
of Section 174 discussed above. There was an even division
of authority as far as the American states were concerned and
yet the rule which the draftsmen personally preferred was rejected. The reason for this surprising action is explained for
us in a note to the Restatement. 24 It reads as follows:
"The latter rule (rule of Deare v. Hal) has been consistently followed in England and nearly or quite half of the decisions on -the question in the United States have also favored the same rule. The other
half give priority to the first in time. The cases are collected in Williston, Contracts, Sec. 435. In the case of Salem Trust Company v.
Manufacturers Finance Company, 264 U. S. 182, 68 Law. Ed. 628, 44
Supreme Ct. Reporter, 266, it was held that the assignee prior in time
should be protected. In view of this decision it is not likely that many
American Courts which have not already adopted the rule of Dearte v.
HaN will do so. The Restatement therefore rejects the rule."

The Restatement committee, then, according to their own
account, rejected the rule of Dearle v. Hall solely out of deference to the Supreme Court's decision in the Salem Trust Company case. 2 5 A decision by the United States Supreme Court
which breaks a deadlock in the authorities and points the way to
forty-eight jurisdictions in the solution of an important commercial problem is destined to be famous, perhaps as famous as
Payne v. Cove or Adams v. Lindsell,. Any reader of Section 173
of the Restatement who has not read the case will hasten to get
the report.
He will find that the facts of the Salem Trust Co. v
Manufacturing Finance Company are briefly these:
On May 16, 1919, the Nelson Blower and Furnace Company
assigned (to the extent of $45,000) to the Salem Trust Co., the
amounts due and to become due upon a certain contract for the
construction of certain engines, and on Jul3 15th, 1919, the
Nelson Blower and Furnace Company assigned the same claim
to the Manufacturers Finance Co. (to the extent of $40,000)
and on September 20, 1919, the Nelson Blower and Furnace Co.
assigned to the Manufacturers Finance Company the same claim
(to the extent of $10,000) and on or about this date the Manufacturers Finance Company gave notice of its assignments to the
debtor. The prior assignee had given the debtor no notice and.
'Restatement, page 276.
0 Ibid.
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neither the debtor nor the second assignee, Manufacturers Finance Company, knew of the prior assignment. The Manufacturers Finance Company, however, made no inquiry of the
debtor at the time of taking its assignments. Th.e Court held
that the Salem Trust Company, the first assignee, who had
given no notice to the debtor, should prevail. While the case
involves other legal questions of importance, it is, as far as this
problem is concerned, the simplest form of case where there are
two successive assignees of the same claim and the first in point
of time was preferred although he had given no notice to the
debtor. It should be noted, however, that the second assignee
made no inquiry of the debtor, whereas in the case of DearZe
v. Hall the party in the position of this second assignee had made
diligent inquiry.
The opinion in the Salem Trust Company case is by Mr.
Justice Butler. Justices Holmes and Brandeis concurred in the
result upon the ground that the case was governed by Massachusetts law, Massachusetts being committed to the so-called American rule, but did not concur in the reasons for the decision as
given by Mr. Butler.
Since the Restatement committee have told us that they rejected the rule of Dearle v. Hall because of the Salem Trust
Company case and their belief that no states not already committed to the rule would adopt it, their reason for rejecting it
is just as strong and no stronger, than the opinion in that case,
and their choice is to be justified only if it is likely that states
will adopt the other rule. If, on the other hand, the case was
so badly considered as to be destined to be discredited, then it is
not so likely to be followed by all jurisdictions not already committed. It is the conviction of the writer that the case will be
thrown into the limelight, thoroughly analyzed and completely
discredited. Mr. Butler's opinion amounts briefly to this:
I. By the first assignment all the rights pass to the first
assignee; the subsequent assignee gets nothing because the assignor has nothing left to give.
II. Notice of the assignment given to the debtor adds
nothing to the title transferred and failure to give notice does
not divest the first assignee of any title. If the second assignee
elects to .reply upon representations made by the assignor he
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cannot shift his loss unless there is some act or omission of the
first assignee which is the cause of his deception.
Mr. Butler's argument completely ignores the possibility of
the first assignee getting title subject to the liability of being divested by the later assignment. To say that the assignor cannot
pass title to the second assignee because the assignor did not
have title is to ignore a well recognized principle that a party
who has not title may nevertheless have a legal power to vest
title in an innocent third party. A vendor of a chattel who has
no title may, if left in possession, be held to have legal power to
vest title in an innocent purchaser. Parties without valid title
continually vest title in third parties where the parties without
title have so-called indicia of title and indorsers of negotiable
paper continually create rights in third parties which they do
not have themselves. Legal power to vest rights in third persons
is not limited by or to the measure of rights which the transferor has or may assert, and it is surprising to find a statement
made by a Justice of the United States Supreme Court to the
effect that a second assignee cannot receive title because the assignor had nothing to pass to him. The argument is almost as
naive as if the Court had said: "If there is but one glass of milk
in a pitcher and two extended glasses, there will be no milk left
to pour into the second glass if the first glass has been poured
full, and it follows that if all the rights are poured out into the
first assignee's glass, then it is a foolish gesture to go through
the motions of pouring rights into the second assignee's glass."
The modern mind fortunately does not work that way, but
recognizes that the term "title" is a figurative term connoting
an intricate group of legal relations presumably existing between
human beings with relation to various types of property and
etc.
compbsed of rights, privileges, powers, immunities,
Whether these rights and privileges may be asserted depends
upon nothing more than the probable decision of courts deciding cases upon the basis of specific sets of facts. If upon the
basis of a certain set of facts growing out of what is called an
assignment from A to B, we may fairly assume that the courts
would protect B in the exercise of certain rights, privileges and
immunities with relation to the chose in action, we may conveniently refer to B as having title; if B does have what we call
title it is because the courts would back him up in the assertion
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of his rights. He does not have title because A had title. A
might have had title without the power to vest title in B, or conversely, A might have had a legal power to vest title in B or C
without having title himself. It is true that the power to vest
title in a third party usually follows the title, but it so frequently
is not true that we get very impractical and unfortunate results
by assuming that legal powers to create rights in third persons
can be accurately determined by looking to the transferor's
title. Mr. Justice Butler was confronted with a choice between
two competing assignees, both of whom had taken assignments
from the same assignor; it was a three-party situation and he
should have kept his mind away from the problem of what the
rights of the first of the two assignees would have been if there
had been a simple two-party situation such as would have been
presented had he been deciding a case involving the rights of one
single assignee with relation to the assignor. The second assignment introduced a new party and a new factual situation. The
new party and the new operative fact, the second assignment,
coming into the situation changed the whole nature of the problem. This new and different problem should have been squarely
met and decided upon the frank basis of his own power to make
a choice between the first and second assignee, the decisions by
reason of being evenly divided, giving him a free hand in making
his choice. His choice was one that was of vast importance to
the business world and he should have been concerned primarily
with the business aspect of the problem. He had an opportunity
to make a decision which would have provided a basis for safety
and security in taking assignments of choses in action by choosing the rule of Dearle v. Hall, but he did not do it. If he
thought the other rule the more practicable working rule and
that there were good practical reasons for believing it would
work better in business he had an opportunity to point out what
those reasons were, but he did not do that. Instead he avoided
admitting that he was doing any choosing one way or another,
in deciding the case. His decision is treated as having flowed
from principle as automatically as if he were a mere inanimate
conductor. Blithely ignoring the business aspect of the problem
and for the most part the entire literature on the subject, he explained that in the nature of.things the second assignee in point
of time got nothing because all of the rights of the assignee had
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already passed to the first assignee. 'Whether Mr. Justice
Butler knew it or not, the reader is apt to see at a glance that
the very thing that he had to decide was whether or not the
rights of the assignor had passed to the first assignee as against
the second assignee. The reason given for the decision is then
upon analysis the decision itself lefthandedly stated, and consequently is no. reason at all. If Mr. Justice Butler's mode of
mental operation compels him to look to the transferor's title or
status as a measure of the transferee's status he would have
done better to inquire whether or not the assignor after the first
assignment had been made still had a power to vest a right in
the second assignee, even though he had already parted with the
title, or to state it conversely, he might have asked himself
whether the first assignee, who admittedly had title as between
himself and the assignor in the first instance, was under a liability that his assignor terminate the rights that composed his
title by exercising his power to vest title in an innocent third
party, the second assignee. His inquiry, then, should have led
him very shortly to the point of recognizing that such a power
could be said to exist if he should say so and only because he
said so. It was his choice and he could not escape it. It is the
belief of the writer that his choice was bad and that it stands
unsupported by any reason other than his own arbitrary prearrived-at decision stated in the form of a reason, and that consequently the decision is not deserving of the deference accorded
to it by the draftsmen of the Restatement of the law. Nor is it
believed that the state courts will desert the admonition of the
great legal writers of the past who have preferred the rule of
Dearle v. Hall, ignore better considered opinions of courts of
lesser dignity, and flock to the rule of this case, even though the
restatement committee felt obliged in the face of their better
judgment to follow it.
The Salem Trust Company case was decided in 1924, and
nearly five years have elapsed, but the writer's examination of
the digests discloses no case showing that any state which was
committed to the rule of Dearle v. Hall has deserted it during,
the period and gone over to the rule of the Salem Trust Company
case. 26 So long as business men find it useful in their business
'In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa in April, 1928, the
prior assignee who had given no notice was preferred over the subsequent assignee giving notice, and Iowa was committed to Dearle v.
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to purchase choses in action or to take assignments of claims
unevidenced by instruments as security for credit extended,
there will be a demand for some basis of safety in taking such
assignments, and so long as that is true there is likely to be a
feeling that this basis of safety can only be achieved by providing some source of information to whom the intending assignee
may go and find out whether or not his purported assignor is
still the owner of the claim, or whether by reason of mistake or
fraud he has assigned the same claim to someone else. A recording system, such as is carried on in connection with real
estate transactions, is not practicable in this field, and the normal
source of information is the debtor. This information is likely
to be given the debtor if the penalty attached to failure to inform the debtor is the application of the rule of Dearle v. Hall.
Aside from the question of safety in taking such assignments
it is believed that the rejection of the rule of Dearle v. HaZl and
the adoption of the rule of the Salem Trust Company case makes
for less simplicity than would have been achieved had the former
rule been chosen by the Restatement committee.
The student who has come to law school with his mind unconfused by erudite controversies as to whether or not the assignment of a chose in action passes legal or equitable title, unbiased by fictional modes of thought, and primarily interested
in practical results, when confronted with Sections 173 and 174
of the restatement is likely to ask this sensible question:
"Why is it that I would get clear title to a chose in action
which I obtained from a fraudulent assignee, when I could easily
have ascertained who his assignor was and by going to the defrauded assignor could have learned in most instances about
the facts of the fraud, but on the other hand must lose my claim
if I purchase a chose in action from a direct obligee who apparently has every right to make the assignment, and it turns out
that this obligee has already assigned the claim to someone else ?
Hall before the decision of the Salem Trust case. But here the prior

assignee was preferred because it was a bonding company, given a prior
lien by statute, of which fact the second assignee was chargeable with
knowledge. Ottuma Boiler Works, et al. v. Omera d Son, 218 N. W. 920.
Also, in the case of Board of Education of City of Blizabeth v. Znlc, 137
At. 713, June, 1927, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey preferred the
first assignee who had given no notice to a second assignee giving
notice and New Jersey was committed to Deare v. Hall but In this
case the second assignee had taken the assignment to secure a preexisting debt and was not a purchaser for value.
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To whom couid I have gone to learn of the prior assignment?
If I had gone to the obligor, since no notice is required and none
was given, the obligor would have answered: 'So far as I know
the original obligee still owns the claim.' "
The only way to be safe in taking an ordinary assignment
of a chose in action against the possible claims of prior assignees,
the student is likely to conclude, is to make inquiry of all the
people in the world who might possibly have purchased the
claim. If the rule of Dearle v. Hall had been adopted by the
draftsmen in Section 173, this confusion would not arise and the,
teacher could tell the student that by making inquiry of the
debtor before taking his assignment that he could be reasonably
safe against any adverse claim of ownership of the chose
whether adverse claim was that of defrauded prior assignee in
his chain of title, defrauded cestui, or prior assignee of his assignor failing to give notice. Such a rule would have the merit
of simplicity, if simplicity in the law is to be desired.
There are many who believe that the second assignee in
point of time who has made inquiry of the debtor should be protected against the prior assignee, who has omitted to give notice
to the debtor, but who nevertheless refuse to go as far as the English rule goes. They would go no farther in protecting the
second assigiee than it was necessary to go in the factual
situation of Dearle v. Halt, where the second assignee had
actually made inquiry of the debtor.
Why, they may
ask, should the second assignee who has not even taken the
trouble to make inquiry of the debtor, be preferred over a prior
assignee, when the omission of the first assignee to give notice
has not deceived the second assignee in any way? The attitude
of parties who take this position is entirely reasonable. It is
actuated perhaps by a deep-seated sense of justice combined with
a feeling that too much emphasis is arbitrarily placed upon
priority of notice to the debtor. Whether the English rule or
the modified form of it last discussed is preferable is perhaps a
question of policy. The recording statutes do not limit the protection of innocent purchasers against adverse parties who have
failed to record to cases in which the innocent purchaser has actually gone to the records. The rule of the recording acts is arbitrary; if the incumbrance is shown upon the records, the subsequent purchaser is assumed to have known of it; if it is not on

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

the record and the subsequent purchaser had no actual knowledge of the incumbrance, he takes free of it regardless of
whether he made a search or took his chance. Whether the
analogy to the recording acts should be made complete in determining the competitive rights of successive assignees of choses
in action or be limited by protecting only the second assignee,
who has made inquiry of the debtor, is too large a problem to be
adequately gone into in this discussion. Either would provide a
businesslike basis for safety in purchasing choses in action or
taking them as security; either would be vastly better than the
rule of Section 173. It is true that the Restatement could have
adopted the rule of the actual case of Deare v. Hall without
going directly in the face of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the Salem Trust Company case, because in the
latter ease, as has been pointed out, the second assignee had
made no inquiry, but it must be admitted that it could not have
been done without flaunting the opinion in the case.
The idea back of the case of Dearle v. Hall is sound because
it is practical and adapted to business needs; the idea of Section
173, while perhaps sound historically and upon theory divorced
from business, is impracticable. The ultimate law upon the
question, it is believed, will be in line with the decision of
Dearlev. HalZ4 the United States Supreme Court and the Restatement to the contrary notwithstanding. Real progress was made
in Section 174; an opportunity for greater progress was overlooked in the drafting of Section 173.
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